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PUNISHING PUBLIC SCHOOL STUDENTS FOR
BASHING PRINCIPALS, TEACHERS &
CLASSMATES IN CYBERSPACE:
THE SPEECH ISSUE THE SUPREME COURT
MUST NOW RESOLVE
CLAY CALVERT*
INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court ended a nearly 20-year hiatus
from resolving student expression cases when it handed down its
splintered 2007 ruling in Morse v. Frederick.1 Although Morse certainly
featured funny, far-fetched facts about bong hits2 that made for a
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thanks Patrick Hanifin and Thomas Markey of The Pennsylvania State University
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1. 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007). Prior to Morse, the High Court's most recent ruling
on student expression rights was in 1988. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier,
484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (holding, in the context of the censorship of two articles in
a high school newspaper, "that educators do not offend the First Amendment by
exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-
sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns").
2. Morse centered on a high school student who was suspended for ten days
after he unfurled, while standing on a sidewalk across from his school as the
Olympic torch relay passed by, a 14-foot banner bearing the words "Bong Hits 4
Jesus." Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622. Calling it "a school-sanctioned and school-
supervised event," Chief Justice John Roberts concluded for a narrow majority of the
High Court:
that schools may take steps to safeguard those entrusted to
their care from speech that can reasonably be regarded as
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"lively" 3 oral argument punctuated by paroxysms of atypical laughter,4 it
did nothing to resolve a much more pervasive and pernicious First
Amendment5 problem cropping up at schools across the country that the
6High Court has never considered. That issue is whether, consistent with
encouraging illegal drug use. We conclude that the
school officials in this case did not violate the First
Amendment by confiscating the pro-drug banner and
suspending the student responsible for it.
Id.
See generally Sonja R. West, Sanctionable Conduct: How the Supreme Court
Stealthily Opened the Schoolhouse Gate, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 27 (2008)
(analyzing the Supreme Court's opinion in Morse).
3. See Linda Greenhouse, Court Hears Whether a Drug Statement Is Protected
Free Speech for Students, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2007, at A 16 (describing the oral
argument as a "lively hour" involving "a series of hypothetical questions from the
justices").
4. The official transcript from the oral argument in Morse includes the notation
"laughter" after Justice Stephen Breyer queried an attorney, "Suppose that this
particular person had whispered to his next door neighbor, 'Bong Hits 4 Jesus, heh
heh heh,' you know. Supposed that's what had happened?" Transcript of Oral
Argument at 21, Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007) (No. 06-278), available
at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argumentjtranscripts/06-278.pdf
(last visited Apr. 3, 2009). See Mark Sherman, Court Probes Limits on Student
Speech in "Bong Hits 4 Jesus " Case, Assoc. PRESS STATE & LOCAL WIRE, Mar. 19,
2007, available on LexisNexis Academic (writing that "laughter filled the
courtroom" when Justice David Souter asked "If the kids look around and they say,
well, so and so has got his bong sign again. They then return to Macbeth. Does the
teacher have to, does the school have to tolerate that sign in the Shakespeare
class?").
5. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in
pertinent part, that "Congress shall make no law ...abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The free speech and free press
clauses were incorporated more than eight decades ago through the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause to apply to state and local government entities and
officials. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
6. The United States Supreme Court has considered a quartet of cases,
including Morse, that focus on the free expression rights of public school students.
In its seminal student-speech ruling in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), the High Court protected the right
of public school students in Iowa to wear black armbands to school as a form of
protest against the war in Vietnam and as a call for a truce in that conflict. The
Court in Tinker held that schools may censor such student displays of political
expression only when there is actual evidence the speech in question "materially
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the constitutional guarantee of free expression, public school officials
may permissibly punish students for speech that defames, disparages or
threatens teachers, administrators and students when that speech is
created off campus, during non-school hours and posted on the internet.
Embedded in this issue are two related questions-the first jurisdictional,
the second substantive-that lower courts are grappling with:
disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of
others." Id. at 513. The Court added, in language highly favorable to student speech
rights, that the government "must be able to show that its action was caused by
something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that
always accompany an unpopular viewpoint." Id. at 509. Similarly, the Court noted
that an "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to
overcome the right to freedom of expression." Id. at 508. Ultimately, the Court in
Tinker concluded that "the record does not demonstrate any facts which might
reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or
material interference with school activities, and no disturbances or disorders on the
school premises in fact occurred." Id. at 514.
More than fifteen years later, the Supreme Court held, in a case involving a
high school student who gave a speech loaded with sexual innuendoes, that:
The First Amendment does not prevent the school officials
from determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech
such as respondent's would undermine the school's basic
educational mission. A high school assembly or classroom is
no place for a sexually explicit monologue directed towards
an unsuspecting audience of teenage students.
Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986). In upholding the school's
discipline of the student, who made the speech in a captive-audience situation before
about 600 other students, the High Court added that "it is a highly appropriate
function of public school education to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms
in public discourse." Id. at 683.
In 1988, in a case involving censorship in a high school newspaper of student-
written articles about pregnancy and divorce, the Supreme Court held that "educators
do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and
content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their
actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." Hazelwood Sch.
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). The Court suggested such
pedagogical concerns include "speech that is, for example, ungrammatical, poorly
written, inadequately researched, biased or prejudiced, vulgar or profane, or
unsuitable for immature audiences." Id. at 271.
See generally Melinda Cupps Dickler, The Morse Quartet: Student Speech And
The First Amendment, 53 LoY. L. REv. 355 (2007) (providing an overview and
analysis of the Supreme Court's opinions in Tinker, Fraser, Kuhlmeier and Morse).
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1. When may school officials properly assert
jurisdiction and disciplinary authority over student
speech that is created and published off campus, on
technologies like computers and cell phones, and
that refers to fellow students, teachers and/or
administrators?
2. If school officials do have proper jurisdictional
and disciplinary authority over such off-campus
speech in a given case, then which substantive
standard or test from the Supreme Court's four
rulings on student expression' is the most
appropriate to apply to determine if the speech is
protected?
It is the first of these two questions-the foundational query of
when school officials may properly assert in-school disciplinary
authority over high-tech, off-campus-created expression-that is the
focus of this article. Without such threshold jurisdictional authority over
the off-campus-created expression, one never reaches the second issue
about which substantive rules from Supreme Court cases like Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School District and Bethel School
District v. Fraser9 should be applied to a given case. Put more bluntly,
the threshold question addressed here is whether the jurisdictional
authority of schools properly extends outside and beyond the geographic
boundary of "the schoolhouse gate"'1 referred to in Tinker and reaches
into private homes and other off-campus venues where students create,
post and transmit interet messages. The problem is real because, as
Nadine Strossen, president of the American Civil Liberties Union
observed, "schools have been suspending and expelling students just for
creating their own Web sites on their own home computers on their own
7. See supra notes 2 and 6 (describing the U.S. Supreme Court's rulings in
these four cases).
8. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). See supra note 6 (describing the Supreme Court's
opinion in Tinker).
9. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). See supra note 6 (describing the Supreme Court's
opinion in Fraser).
10. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
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time"'" because the students "dared to express views that were critical of
the school or of particular teachers."'
2
Although the quandary' 3 regarding the permissibility of on-
campus punishment for off-campus speech14 conveyed on new
technologies has plagued courts for a decade now,15 it has yet to be
11. Nadine Strossen, Keeping the Constitution Inside the Schoolhouse Gate-
Students' Rights Thirty Years After Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 445, 457 (2000).
12. Id.
13. The word "quandary" seems appropriate to describe the situation, as at
least one legal scholar has observed that the "interrelationship between the Internet
and the First Amendment rights of public school students is a complex topic" and
that "even more difficult questions are raised when the student's Internet activities
are completely disassociated from the school environment." Leora Harpaz, Internet
Speech and the First Amendment Rights of Public School Students, 2000 BYU
EDUC. & L. J. 123, 124, 126.
14. In a recent law journal article, attorney Justin P. Markey contends that
"student Internet speech is never truly 'off-campus"' because "when a student posts
information on the Internet, that information may be accessed by anyone, both inside
and outside the schoolhouse gates." Justin P. Markey, Enough Tinkering With
Students' Rights: The Need for an Enhanced First Amendment Standard to Protect
Off-Campus Student Internet Speech, 36 CAP. U.L. REV. 129, 149 (2007). This
article focuses its analysis on speech that is created off campus by students, during
non-school hours and on non-school computers, regardless of whether that speech
later can be received, viewed or downloaded on campus. It is taken as a given, in
fact, that any website, absent filtering software, can be downloaded either on campus
or off.
15. The first federal court opinion addressing a school's ability to punish a
student for off-campus created speech posted on the internet was handed down in
1998. Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
That dispute involved a website created by a Missouri high school student named
Brandon Beussink at home, on his own computer and during non-school hours. Id. at
1177. The site featured crude and vulgar language that was highly critical of the
administration at the student's high school. Id. In ruling in favor of the student,
who had been suspended for ten days, U.S. District Judge Rodney W. Sippel applied
the United States Supreme Court's substantial-and-material disruption standard
adopted in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S.
503 (1969). Beussink, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1180. In rather robust language extolling
the importance of freedom of expression, Judge Sippel reasoned that "it is
provocative and challenging speech, like Beussink's, which is most in need of the
protections of the First Amendment. Popular speech is not likely to provoke
censure. It is unpopular speech that invites censure." Id. at 1182. The judge added
that "the public interest is not only served by allowing Beussink's message to be free
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from censure, but also by giving the students at Woodland High School this
opportunity to see the protections of the United States Constitution and the Bill of
Rights at work." Id.
Examples of other early federal cases addressing online student speech rights
include: Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1089 (W.D.
Wash. 2000) (ruling in favor of a high school student who was disciplined by his
school for creating a website, at home and without school resources, that featured
mock, tongue-in-cheek obituaries of fellow students and that "allowed visitors to the
web site to vote on who would 'die' next-that is, who would be the subject of the
next mock obituary"); Killion v. Frankin Reg'l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446
(W.D. Pa. 2001) (ruling in favor of a student who was disciplined for creating and
emailing, from his home computer, a top-ten list critical of his high school's athletic
director); Coy v. Bd. of Educ. North Canton City Sch., 205 F. Supp. 2d 791, 795
(N.D. Ohio 2002) (involving a student who was disciplined for creating, on his home
computer on his own time, a website that called several classmates "losers," included
"a sentence describing one boy as being sexually aroused by his mother," and
"contained two pictures of boys giving the 'finger,' some profanity, and a
depressingly high number of spelling and grammatical errors"); Mahaffey v.
Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 781, 786 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (ruling in favor of student
who was disciplined for contributing content to a website called "Satan's web page"
that was created by another student, and concluding that school officials' "regulation
of Plaintiffs speech on the website without any proof of disruption to the school or
on campus activity in the creation of the website was a violation of Plaintiffs First
Amendment rights"); Flaherty v. Keystone Oaks Sch. Dist., 247 F. Supp. 2d 698,
706 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (holding, in the context of a case involving a student who
posted insulting messages on a website message board regarding an upcoming
volleyball game with another high school, that a high school's policies regarding
abusive speech were both "unconstitutionally overbroad and vague because they
permit a school official to discipline a student for an abusive, offensive, harassing or
inappropriate expression that occurs outside of school premises and not tied to a
school related activity.").
At the state court level, a major early opinion on the issue of internet-posted
student speech was handed down by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 2002. See
J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002) (holding that a school
district's disciplinary action against a student who created a website at home that
contained derogatory, profane, offensive and threatening statements directed toward
one of the student's teachers and his principal did not violate the student's First
Amendment rights).
Several legal scholars have addressed these early cases. See generally Clay
Calvert, Off-Campus Speech, On-Campus Punishment: Censorship Of The Emerging
Internet Underground, 7 B.U. J. Sc. & TECH. L. 243 (2001) (providing a review and
analysis of some early judicial opinions addressing the power of school authorities to
punish students for internet content created off campus); Aaron A. Caplan, Public
School Discipline For Creating Uncensored Anonymous Internet Forums, 39
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resolved and, in fact, it has picked up substantial steam at the federal
court level since the High Court handed down Morse less than two years
ago.
In particular, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
May 2008 held in Doninger v. Niehof&6 that school officials did not
violate the First Amendment speech rights of student Avery Doninger
when they prohibited her from running for senior class secretary after she
posted statements, while off campus, on a blog that referred to school
administrators as "douchebags in central office"17 and encouraged
classmates to call one administrator "to piss her off more."18 The Second
Circuit noted the High Court's failure to address such an off-campus
speech issue, writing that "the Supreme Court has yet to speak on the
scope of a school's authority to regulate expression that, like Avery's,
does not occur on school grounds or at a school-sponsored event."' 9 As
Avery Doninger's mother, Lauren Doninger, told a reporter after the
appellate court ruled against her daughter, "We need to really explore
student speech rights at the judicial level in the age of the Internet., 20
The High Court, in fact, recently passed up just such an
opportunity to address this question when it denied a petition for a writ
of certiorari in March 2008 in Wisniewski v. Board of Education of
Weedsport Central School District.21 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
WILLAMETTE L. REv. 93 (2003) (analyzing several early cases involving the
authority of schools over student speech created off campus and posted on the
internet); David L. Hudson, Jr., Censorship Of Student Internet Speech: The Effect
Of Diminishing Student Rights, Fear Of The Internet And Columbine, 2000 L. REv.
M.S.U.-D.C.L. 199 (analyzing five cases of students punished for their off-campus
internet speech content and contextualizing them within the scope of school
officials' fears about both Columbine-like tragedies and the use of new
technologies).
16. 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008).
17. Id. at 45.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 48.
20. Arielle Levin Becker, Student Loses Internet Rights Case Appeal,
HARTFORD COURANT (Conn.), May 30, 2008, at Al, available at
http://74.125.93.104/search?q=cache:vMmvOJ8U1HYJ:www.courant.com/communi
ty/news/fv/hc-doningercase0530,0,5030442.story+%22Student+Loses+Internet+
Rights+Case+Appeal%22&cd=2&hl=en&ct=-clnk&gl=us (last visited Apr. 3, 2009).
21. 128 S. Ct. 1741 (2008).
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Second Circuit in Wisniewski in July 2007-less than one full month
after the High Court's decision in Morse-ruled in favor of school
officials and rejected "a First Amendment challenge to an eighth-grade
student's suspension for sharing with friends via the Internet a small
drawing crudely, but clearly, suggesting that a named teacher should be
shot and killed., 22 The Second Circuit noted that the Supreme Court in
Morse "had no occasion to consider the circumstances under which
,,•• 23
school authorities may discipline students for off-campus activities.
But the Second Circuit is not the only federal court post-Morse
to address the jurisdictional authority of schools over off-campus-created
speech conveyed on the internet. For instance, a federal judge in the
Western District of Pennsylvania considered the issue in Layshock v.
Hermitage School District,24 a decision appealed to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit2 5 in 2008 and still pending at the time this
article was written. Layshock involves a student, Justin Layshock, who
was suspended from school for creating a scathing and fake MySpace
profile of his principal, Eric Trosch, "by using his grandmother's
computer, at her home, during non-school hours. No school resources
were used to create the profile.' '26 As described later in this article, the
district court judge in Layshock seemed to be much more hesitant in
extending jurisdictional authority to school officials over off-campus-
created internet speech targeting teachers, principals and students than
was the Second Circuit in both Doninger and Wisniewski.
Finally, and most recently, in September 2008, a federal court in
the Middle District of Pennsylvania in J.S. v. Blue Mountain School
Distric?7 ruled in favor of school officials who suspended a student for
creating, from her home computer and during non-school hours, a fake
MySpace profile of her principal that stated the principal "is a pedophile
22. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 35
(2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1741 (2008).
23. Id. at 39 n.3.
24. 496 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Pa. 2007).
25. Joe Pinchot, School District, Layshocks Appeal Judge's Decision, HERALD
(Sharon, Pa.), Dec. 5, 2007, at 1.
26. Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 590-91.
27. Memorandum & Order, J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., No. 3:07cv585
(M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2008), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-
courts/pennsylvania/pamdce/3:2007cv00585/67046/55/0.pdf.
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and a sex addict. ' 28 Although U.S. District Judge James M. Munley
acknowledged "that the line between on-campus and off-campus speech
is blurred with increased use of the Internet,, 29 he nonetheless found
there was a sufficient "connection between the off-campus action and on-
campus effect ' 30 that the school possessed disciplinary jurisdiction over
the student's web-based expression.
The need to examine the issue of the jurisdictional authority of
public schools over high-tech, off-campus-created student expression
thus is both paramount and timely. It is so, in part, because "the
[i]ntemet has become a school's new bathroom wall" 3' where "a
student's strategic online postings today can destroy reputations, end
relationships and intensify negative feelings., 32  Courts, in turn, are
scrambling to deal with the situation, but without guidance from the U.S.
Supreme Court. 33  As a writer for the non-profit Student Press Law
Center in Arlington, Virginia, put it in the organization's Fall 2008
report:
Despite the explosion in the popularity of social-
networking sites and blogs-and in the number of
disciplinary sanctions doled out to students for
online expression-the Supreme Court has yet to
decide a student Internet speech case. So lower
courts have been left to their own, often
contradictory, interpretations in mulling how far
school authority extends.34
28. Id. at 1-2.
29. Id. at 13 n.5.
30. Id. at 14.
31. Evie Blad, Networking Web Sites Enable New Generation of Bullies, ARK.
DEMOCRAT-GAZEtTE (Little Rock, Ark.), Apr. 6, 2008, at Al.
32. Id.
33. See Kara D. Williams, Comment, Public Schools vs. Myspace &
Facebook: The Newest Challenge To Student Speech Rights, 76 U. C[N. L. REv. 707,
710 (2008) (writing that "[w]hile the Supreme Court has yet to rule on a case
involving student speech on the Internet, the lower courts have decided multiple
cases on this specific issue.").
34. Kelsey Beltramea, Tangled Web: Courts Conflict in Efforts to Define
Schools' Power Over Online Speech, REPORT (Student Press Law Center, Arlington,
Va.), Fall 2008, at 10.
[Vol. 7
2009] SCHOOL BASHING IN CYBERSPACE
In the absence of a ruling from the U.S. Supreme Court, some
schools are filling the judicial vacuum and seizing the opportunity for
censorship.35 They are now adopting polices that attempt to restrict the
online, off-campus speech of their students. 36  As the Grand Rapids
Press reported in December 2007, the Grand Blanc School District in
Michigan adopted a policy that "regulates students' after-school postings
on the Internet." 37 That policy drew the wrath of the local American
Civil Liberties Union chapter for its intrusion upon the First Amendment
38
right of free expression. Other school districts have adopted similar
policies that punish students for comments they post online while at
home.
39
Some school districts are claiming jurisdiction over off-campus-
created internet speech on the flimsiest of grounds, legal or otherwise.
For instance, in June 2008 a senior at Braden River High School in
Manatee County, Florida, was not allowed to attend his graduation40
ceremony. The reason? Because "profanity, sexual innuendo and
threats of violence" were allegedly included in a song that the student
35. See Christi Cassel, Note, Keep Out of Myspace!: Protecting Students from
Unconstitutional Suspensions and Expulsions, 49 WM. & MARY L. REv. 643, 646
(2007) (asserting that "with little judicial guidance, school officials are taking
matters into their own hands, frequently overstepping constitutional boundaries.").
36. See generally As bullies go online, schools start cracking down, THE
CAPITAL (Annapolis, Md.), Dec. 24, 2007, at B5 (reporting that "[s]tates from Rhode
Island to Arkansas to Oregon have proposed legislation that would make
cyberbullying between students subject to expulsion or prosecution-whether
committed at school, at home or via cell phone text message" (emphasis added)),
available on LexisNexis Academic.
37. ACLU Protests School District's Internet Policy, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS
(Mich.), Dec. 3, 2007, at B6.
38. Id.
39. See Michael W. Hoskins, Courts Grapple with Issues Arising from
Internet, Blogs, INDIANAPOLIS Bus. J., Mar. 12, 2007, at 20 (writing that "[als
officials recognize that off-campus activity can spill into school hallways and
classrooms, many are looking to policies that can prevent those actions outside
school from impacting student safety or the overall educational process," and noting
that in Indiana, "Carmel High School has used its policy against harassment and
bullying to punish students for online comments.").
40. Editorial, School Fails Basic Free Speech Test, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES
(Fla.), June 7, 2008, at 8A.
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had recorded himself and then uploaded on MySpace. 4 1 He never sang
the song in school, but school officials "said they had jurisdiction
because some students had listened to the song at school on iPods. 42 In
other words, simply because other students downloaded the song, put it
on their iPods and then listened to it on school grounds, the school
claimed it could punish the singer-student.
Other school districts simply do not know what to do, given the
lack of definitive precedent from the High Court. As Emily J. Leader,
deputy chief counsel for the Pennsylvania School Boards Association,
stated, "'[T]he biggest problem with cyberbullying is, do we have
jurisdiction? Whether we can discipline is a gray area that hasn't been
completely tested in the courts."'
43
This article analyzes and examines judicial approaches used by
federal courts in 2007 and 2008 for addressing the jurisdictional question
of a school's ability to discipline its students for speech about classmates,
teachers and administrators that they create off campus, on their own
time and without the use of school resources. Initially, Part I of the
article briefly describes the absence of U.S. Supreme Court opinions on
this issue, and it also illustrates how courts have treated the scope of
school authority over off-campus speech in contexts other than the
internet.44 Furthermore, Part I emphasizes an important point: that
teachers, administrators and students would not be left remediless if the
Supreme Court were to eventually hold that schools lack jurisdiction
over off-campus-created internet speech that a student does not
download on campus.
Part II then extensively examines the opinions in Doninger,
Wisniewski, Layshock and JS. as they relate to the threshold
jurisdictional issue.45 In particular, this part exposes what the author of
this article believes are serious flaws and weaknesses with the approach
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Rebecca Vandermeulen, Cyberbullying: The Schoolyard has Moved to the
Internet as a Bullying Ground for Youngsters, READING EAGLE (Reading, Pa.), Nov.
2, 2007, at Al. See generally Dan Hansen, Schools Address High-Tech Bullying,
SPOKESMAN-REv. (Wash.), Aug. 4, 2008, at IA (describing incidents of
cyberbullying and noting efforts of both legislative bodies and schools to restrict it).
44. Infra notes 48-74 and accompanying text.
45. Infra notes 75-179 and accompanying text.
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adopted by the Second Circuit in both Doninger and Wisniewski, as well
as in the method embraced by the federal district court judge in JS. In
contrast, the language in the district court's opinion in Layshock is much
more favorable to the off-campus speech rights of minors who post
content about schoolmates, teachers and administrators.
Part III goes beyond these legal opinions to analyze the actual
briefs filed in 2008 with the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit by both Justin Layshock and his opponent, the Hermitage School
District, in order to scrutinize the competing arguments made regarding
the proper extent of school jurisdiction over off-campus-created internetS46
expression. Significantly, Part III explores an important dichotomy in
the way the First Amendment rights of off-campus minors are perceived
by the parties in such litigation: the off-campus minor as a student
against the off-campus minor as a citizen, with the former position
advocated by schools and the latter view taken by the individuals and
advocacy groups challenging the schools. Finally, Part IV not only urges
the U.S. Supreme Court to soon consider a case like those that are the
focus of this article, but it also calls for the High Court, if and when it
does take on such a case, to reject the reasoning of both the Second
Circuit in Doninger and Wisniewski and the federal district court in J.S.
41
I. THE UNRESOLVED ISSUE OF OFF-CAMPUS EXPRESSION
IN THE DIGITAL AGE
In its June 2008 friend-of-the-court brief filed before the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Layshock v. Hermitage
School District, the Student Press Law Center succinctly argued by
analogy for application of precedent supporting public school
punishment of out-of-school, internet-based speech:
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence is clear, and
technological innovation does not render it null. If
the publication of a student's speech does not take
place on school grounds, at a school function, or by
means of school resources, a school cannot punish
46. Infra notes 180-190 and accompanying text.
47. Infra notes 191-194 and accompanying text.
the student without violating his First Amendment
48
rights .
Indeed, the Supreme Court has never considered a case directly
on point.
The High Court has addressed scenarios involving the wearing
on campus of black armbands,49 a student speech made on campus,5° and
a high-school newspaper produced on campus as part of a journalism
class. 51 More recently, where the speech at issue in Morse v. Frederick
52
involved a banner unfurled by a student while standing on the sidewalk
across the street from his campus, the Supreme Court treated the speech
as if it were on campus because it took place "during normal school
hours' 53 and at "a school-sanctioned and school-supervised event, ' 54 in
which "[t]eachers and administrative officials monitored the students'
actions., 55 In other words, as suggested by the language cited above
from the Student Press Law Center's brief, it was considered a "school
fuction." ,
5 6
Importantly, Chief Justice John Roberts in Morse hinted, albeit
in passing, at the problem facing courts with off-campus internet speech
cases. He wrote that "there is some uncertainty at the outer boundaries
as to when courts should apply school-speech precedents. 57 For this
proposition, Roberts cited a footnote in a 2004 opinion in which the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit observed that it was "aware of the
difficulties posed by state regulation of student speech that takes place
48. Brief for Student Press Law Center and Pennsylvania Center for the First
Amendment as Amici Curiae Filed in Support of Appellees/Cross-Appellants, at 6,
Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., Nos. 07-4465 & 07-4555 (3d Cir. June 3, 2008),
available at http://www.splc.org/pdf/layshockSPLCamicus.pdf (last visited Apr. 3,
2009) [hereinafter SPLC Brief].
49. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
50. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
51. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
52. 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
53. Id. at 2624.
54. Id. at 2622.
55. Id.
56. See SPLC Brief, supra note 48, at 6.
57. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2624 (citing Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393
F.3d 608, 615, n.22 (5th Cir. 2004)).
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off-campus and is later brought on-campus either by the communicating
student or others to whom the message was communicated.
58
When students have engaged in much more primitive forms of
speech off campus that are directed at teachers or fellow students, lower
federal courts generally have protected the student expression.59 This
should not come as a surprise because, as one attorney who has litigated
cases involving student internet expression wryly wrote, "when Tinker
said that students do not shed their First Amendment rights at the
schoolhouse gate, it necessarily implied that they have the ordinary
complement of First Amendment rights outside those gates. Otherwise,
they would have nothing to shed (or not shed).,, 60  As Judge Richard
Posner of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit observed in a
case involving the out-of-school First Amendment rights of minors to
access violent video games, "children have First Amendment rights. ' ' 1
For instance, in a case involving a student suspended from
school after he gave the middle-finger salute62 to a teacher in an off-
campus restaurant parking lot, a federal district court held that the
student's First Amendment right of free expression was violated by the
63
on-campus discipline. The court stated that the proper remedy for such
58. Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 615 n.22 (5th Cir.
2004).
59. See Klein v. Smith, 635 F. Supp. 1440, 1442 n.4 (D. Me. 1986) (protecting
against school punishment a student who raised his middle finger toward a teacher
while off campus in a car in a restaurant parking lot, and writing that "the effective
response to out-of-school misbehavior would be the swift
application of that parental discipline which is here roundly deserved.").
60. Caplan, supra note 15, at 140. See supra note 6 (providing an overview of
the Supreme Court's ruling in Tinker).
61. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 576 (2001)
(citing Erznozik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212-14 (1975); Tinker v. Des
Moines Ind. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511-14 (1969)).
62. See generally Ira P. Robbins, Digitus Impudicus: The Middle Finger and
the Law, 41 U.C. DAVis L. REV. 1403 (2008) (describing the origin and history of
the middle-finger gesture and examining the scope and sweep of First Amendment-
based protection for its use).
63. Klein v. Smith, 635 F. Supp. 1440, 1442 (D. Me. 1986) (concluding that a
ten-day suspension imposed on a student for extending a middle finger toward a
teacher while off school grounds was unconstitutional (citing Hammond v.
Adkisson, 536 F.2d 237, 239 (8th Cir. 1976); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25-6
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obstreperous speech should be left to parents, not school officials, as it
wrote that "the effective response to out-of-school misbehavior would be
the swift application of that parental discipline which is here roundly
deserved." 64 By analogy, many students who today create websites while
off campus that mock school officials and fellow classmates are, in
essence, hoisting a metaphorical middle finger at them-not in a
restaurant parking lot, but in the vast reaches of cyberspace.
In a case involving an underground student newspaper that was
,65
"printed outside the school," not sold on campus, and for which "any
activity within the school itself was de minimis,"66 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit wrote three decades ago that "because
school officials have ventured out of the school yard and into the general
community where the freedom accorded expression is at its zenith, their
actions must be evaluated by the principles that bind government
officials in the public arena. ', 67 Here, too, the Court noted that parents,
not school authorities, should police off-campus conduct of minors,
writing that:
the First Amendment forbids public school
administrators and teachers from regulating the
material to which a child is exposed after he leaves
school each afternoon. Parents still have their role to
play in bringing up their children, and school
officials, in such instances, are not empowered to
68
assume the character of parens patriae.
As described later in Part III of this article, the distinction
between parental control versus school control, made by the Court, draws
from arguments made in 2008 by the attorneys for Justin Layshock in
favor of treating minors, when they are off campus, as citizens rather
than students.69
(1971); Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); State v.
John W., 418 A.2d 1097 (Me. 1980)).
64. Id. at 1441 n.4.
65. Thomas v. Bd. of Educ. Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050
(2d Cir. 1979).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1051.
69. See infra notes 180-182 and accompanying text.
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At this stage, it is important to raise one more point: were the
United States Supreme Court eventually to hear a case like Doninger or
Layshock and were it, in turn, to hold that schools lack jurisdictional
authority to punish students for off-campus created speech that they do
not download at school, this result would not leave the victims of their
speech remediless. For instance, the principal in Layshock filed a
defamation lawsuit against Justin Layshock based upon the same fake
MySpace profile of Trosch that led to Layshock's suspension from
school.70 In other words, off-campus remedies (civil lawsuits) already
exist for the victims of off-campus speech. Similarly, a high school girl,
falsely called a "slut" on a website created off-campus by a classmate,
had an adequate remedy in defamation law against the classmate,
regardless of whether the school punishes the classmate.7' Indeed,
"many lawsuits have been filed by people who say they were defamed by
something that appeared online. 72  Minors learn a very important
lesson-one more profound than any possible classroom lecture on the
subject-when they are sued for defamation or a related cause of action.
These facts, of course, raise a very important question: why should
schools be able to punish students for off-campus-created expression
when the victims of that expression already have off-campus remedies
for any harm they may suffer?
The fact that such real-world remedies do exist clearly militates
against extending the jurisdictional authority of schools over such off-
campus expression. Why should the courts, then, allow a student to be
punished twice-once by a libel suit, once by a suspension? As the
70. See Joe Pinchot, Principal Sues 4 Ex-Students Over Profiles on Myspace,
HERALD (Sharon, Pa.), Apr. 4, 2007, at Al. The defamation lawsuit was still
pending at the time this article was written.
71. See Stanton v. Metro Corp., 438 F.3d 119, 130 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding that
a magazine article was reasonably susceptible "to the defamatory meaning" that the
plaintiff "engages in sexually promiscuous conduct"); Bryson v. News Am. Publ'n,
Inc., 672 N.E.2d 1207, 1218 (Ill. 2006) (finding that the term "slut," as used in a
magazine article, conveyed a defamatory meaning and noting that, "in the present
age, the term 'slut' is commonly used and understood to refer to sexual
promiscuity."). See generally KENT R. MIDDLETON & WILLIAM E. LEE, THE LAW OF
PUBLIC COMMUNICATION 105 (7th ed., 2009) (writing that "assertions that a person's
sexual conduct deviates from generally accepted norms usually are defamatory").
72. WAYNE OVERBECK, MAJOR PRINCIPLES OF MEDIA LAW 160 (1st 2009).
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Student Press Law Center argues in its brief now before the Third Circuit
in Layshock, "Principal Trosch should be left to pursue his private legal
remedy; this Court should not legitimize the use of public power to settle
private scores. ' 73 On the other hand, school administrators "are worried
about the disruption of the learning process ' ' 74 that off-campus, web-
based speech can cause and thus want to censor it, regardless of whether
the individuals attacked have their own private, civil-law remedies.
With both the abovementioned question and the counter-
responses to it in mind, this article turns to the opinions in four post-
Morse federal court cases that have dealt with in-school punishment for
student speech created off campus and posted on the internet.
II. How COURTS AFTER MORSE ARE ADDRESSING SCHOOL
AUTHORITY OVER OFF-CAMPUS-CREATED,
INTERNET-BASED SPEECH
There have been four federal court rulings-two in 2007 and two
in 2008-since the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Morse that have
addressed the topic of in-school punishment for speech created by
students while off campus and posted on the internet. They are
addressed separately in Sections A, B, C and D below.
A. Wisniewski v. Board of Education of the Weedsport Central School
District
In July 2007, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit determined that a public middle school had jurisdiction to punish
a student, Aaron Wisniewski, for speech that he sent and created while
instant messaging (IM) from his parents' home computer. The speech at
issue was a disturbing IM icon, described by the appellate court as "a
small drawing of a pistol firing a bullet at a person's head, above which
were dots representing splattered blood. 76 Underneath the icon was the
73. See SPLC Brief, supra note 48, at 21.
74. Alan Gomez, Students, Officials Locking Horns Over Blogs, USA TODAY,
Oct. 26, 2006, at 8D.
75. 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1741 (2008).
76. Id. at 36.
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message "Kill Mr. VanderMolen," a reference to Wisniewski's English
teacher.77
Wisniewski sent the icon to fifteen members of his so-called
buddy list, some of whom were fellow students, but he did not send it to
VanderMolen or any other school officials.78 In fact, VanderMolen and
school officials only discovered the icon through an indirect chain of
events, several weeks after the icon had circulated, when they learned
about it from a student who actually was never sent the icon by
Wisniewski but who heard about it and, in blunt terms, ratted
Wisniewksi out.7 9 As the appellate court wrote:
it came to the attention of another classmate, who
informed VanderMolen of Aaron's icon and later
supplied him with a copy of the icon. VanderMolen,
distressed by this information, forwarded it to the
high school and middle school principals, who
brought the matter to the attention of the local
police, the Superintendent Mabbett, and Aaron's
parents.8 °
In addressing the threshold question of whether the school had
jurisdictional authority to possibly punish Aaron Wisniewski, the Second
Circuit started from the pivotal premise that "[t]he fact that Aaron's
creation and transmission of the IM icon occurred away from school
property does not necessarily insulate him from school discipline." 81 In
brief, the long arm of school authority does not necessarily stop at the
schoolhouse gate.
The question then became: how far does that arm stretch? The
Second Circuit found it could stretch, rubberband-like, to Wisniewski's
home-created speech because, on the facts of the case, there was "a
reasonably foreseeable risk that the icon would come to the attention of
school authorities . . .., As the appellate court wrote, "it was
reasonably foreseeable that the IM icon would come to the attention of
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 39 (emphasis added).
82. Id. at 38.
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school authorities and the teacher whom the icon depicted being shot." 3
For the Second Circuit, the fact that the student did not intend for the
icon to come to the attention of either his teacher or other school officials
made no difference.84 As the appellate court put it, school discipline was
permitted "whether or not Aaron intended his IM icon to be
communicated to school authorities .... ,85
The rule, then, from Wisniewski appears to boil down to a rather
primitive "if-then" formula: If it is reasonably foreseeable that student
speech created off campus will come to the attention of school
authorities, then school authorities may exert disciplinary authority
over it.
Applying this rule of what might be called reasonably
foreseeable attention to the facts of the case, the appellate court wrote
that "[t]he potentially threatening content of the icon and the extensive
distribution of it, which encompassed 15 recipients, including some of
Aaron's classmates, during a three-week circulation period, made this
risk at least foreseeable to a reasonable person, if not inevitable., 86 It is
important to note from this statement that the content of the speech itself
is a factor in determining whether it is reasonably foreseeable that the
speech will come to the attention of school officials. The implicit
relationship lurking in this formula appears to be that the more
threatening or shocking the content, the more foreseeable it is that the
speech will come to the attention of administrators. Other foreseeability
factors apparently are the scope of distribution of the speech ("the
extensive distribution of it") 87 and the duration of publication ("a three-
week circulation period). 88
There seemingly was some disagreement, however, among the
three judges on the Second Circuit panel in Wisniewski about the precise
nature of the jurisdictional rule that should apply. In writing the
unanimous three-judge opinion, Circuit Judge Jon 0. Newman observed
that "the panel is divided as to whether it must be shown that it was
83. Id. at 39.
84. Id. at 40.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 39-40.
87. Id. at 39.
88. Id. at 40.
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reasonably foreseeable that Aaron's IM icon would reach the school
property or whether the undisputed fact that it did reach the school
preternits any inquiry as to this aspect of reasonable foreseeability.,
89
Judge Newman dropped a footnote stating that:
Judge [John M.] Walker, who otherwise fully
concurs in this opinion and in the judgment, would
hold that a school may discipline a student for off-
campus expression that is likely to cause a
disruption on campus only if it was foreseeable to a
reasonable adult, cognizant of the perspective of a
student, that the expression might reach campus.
90
Although Walker did not write a separate concurring opinion, his
apparent concern, as interpreted and expressed by Judge Newman in that
same footnote, was that application of the foreseeability test without also
considering the perspective of the student "would raise substantial First
Amendment concerns, as it might permit a school to punish a student for
the content of speech the student could never have anticipated reaching
the school, such as a draft letter concealed in his night-stand, stolen by
another student, and delivered to school authorities."
91
From where does this concern arise? According to Judge
Newman's footnote, 92 it comes from the holding of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Porter v. Ascension Parish
School Board.93 That case, centering on a violently-themed drawing
made by a student on a sketchpad, involved "off-campus speech brought
on-campus without the knowledge or permission of the speaker."94 The
Fifth Circuit in Porter held that "the fact that [the student's] drawing was
composed off-campus'and remained off-campus for two years until it
89. Id. at 39. Newman noted, however, that this disagreement did not affect
the decision in any way, writing that "we are in agreement . . . that, on the
undisputed facts, it was reasonably foreseeable that the IM icon would come to the
attention of school authorities and the teacher whom the icon depicted being shot."
Id.
90. Id. at 39 n.4 (emphasis added).
91. Id.
92. Id. (citing Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608 (5th Cir.
2004)).
93. 393 F.3d 608 (5th Cir. 2004).
94. Id. at 619 (emphasis added).
229
230 FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW rVol. 7
was unintentionally taken to school by his younger brother takes the
present case outside the scope of' 95 Tinker and other Supreme Court
precedents on student free expression. In other words, general principles
of First Amendment jurisprudence applicable to all citizens (adults and
minors) applied to the student-artist in Porter. The Fifth Circuit thus
found that "expressions such as [the student's off-campus] drawing,
provided that they do not constitute a true threat, are entitled to First
Amendment protection."96 The true threats doctrine referred to in this
statement is a rule of non-protection for certain speech that applies to all
people, adults and minors, and thus is not a special school-only rule like
Tinker.
97
It is unclear, however, just how much additional protection for
student speech is brought by Judge Walker's suggestion that "the
perspective of a student"98 must be taken into account by an adult in
determining whether it is reasonably foreseeable that off-campus-created
speech will come to the attention of school officials. No other details
were provided, and Judge Walker, unfortunately, did not write a separate
concurring opinion to elaborate on this point.
At this stage, then, it is important to unpack and dissect the
Second Circuit's rule regarding a school's jurisdiction over high-tech,
off-campus-created expression like Aaron Wisniewski's IM icon.
Apparently the rule is that schools have jurisdiction to discipline students
for such speech if it is reasonably foreseeable that the speech will come
to the attention of school officials.
The notion of reasonable foreseeability that some result or
consequence might transpire or occur-in this case, the reasonable
foreseeability that the off-campus-created speech will capture the
attention of school officials-invokes basic negligence principles,
borrowed from tort law and applied here to a constitutional question of
95. Id. at 615 n.22.
96. Id. at 618.
97. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (defining true threats as
"those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of
an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of
individuals" and noting that "the First Amendment also permits a State to ban a 'true
threat').
98. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 39 n.4 (2d Cir. 2007).
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First Amendment protection for student expression. In particular, under
negligence standards, a person generally "has a duty to exercise
reasonable care with regard to foreseeable risks of harm arising from
one's conduct." 99 It is axiomatic in tort law that "[f]oreseeable risks of
harm are a predicate for liability"100 and that "[a] negligence lawsuit
generally focuses on the foreseeable risks of harm arising out of one's
conduct and whether, in light of those risks, the conduct or failure to act
was reasonable or unreasonable."' 0'1 As the Supreme Court of California
recently wrote, under general negligence principles, a "legal duty
generally is owed to the class of persons who it is reasonably foreseeable
may be injured as the result of the actor's conduct."' '
This is very similar to the jurisdictional rule applied in
Wisniewski, as one must ask whether there is a reasonably foreseeable
risk or chance that the student speech that allegedly causes some harm
will come to the attention of school officials. A student risks discipline
(in-school liability, as it were) if it is reasonably foreseeable that his or
her speech will come to the attention of school authorities.
103
Applying negligence principles to speech-based liability issues is
not unusual. For instance, negligence is commonly applied as a fault
standard in defamation law when the plaintiff is a private person.' °4 But
negligence, when used as a fault standard in defamation law, does not
focus on the reasonable foreseeability of results occurring, like a website
coming to the attention of a school official; instead, negligence in
99. DOMINICK VETRI ET AL., TORT LAW AND PRACTICE 43 (2d ed. rev. 2003)
(emphasis added).
100. Id. at 44.
101. Id. (emphasis added).
102. Lugtu v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 28 P.3d 249, 256 (Cal. 2001) (emphasis
added).
103. See Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 38 (asking whether there is "a reasonably
foreseeable risk that the icon would come to the attention of school authorities"
(emphasis added)).
104. See, e.g., Magnusson v. N.Y. Times Co., 98 P.3d 1070, 1079 (Okla. 2004)
(writing that "this Court determined that a reasonable balance between the right of
the news media and the right of a private individual as against libel or slander was
best achieved by a negligence test" (emphasis added)). See generally PAUL SIEGEL,
COMMUNICATION LAW IN AMERICA 151 (2002) (writing that "[t]he majority of states
require that private plaintiffs prove that defamatory remarks were made with
negligence").
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defamation law focuses on the reasonable care (or lack thereof) that a
reporter took in writing a story,' °5 such that "reasonable care would
likely mean those attributes that are common to sound journalism." 0 6
There is, then, an important difference, between two uses of negligence
principles: reasonable foreseeability v. reasonable conduct.
In fact, some courts have expressed a strong presumption against
employing negligence principles that relate to the reasonable
foreseeability of a result occurring in speech-based cases. This is
particularly true in lawsuits in which a speech product, such as a movie,
video game, or book, is alleged to have caused its watchers or readers to
commit violence against others. For instance, a California appellate
court in 1981 specifically rejected applying negligence principles in
determining whether a television network should be held civilly liable for
a sexual assault that allegedly occurred because the attackers were
inspired by a movie shown on the network. 0 7  The court rejected
imposing what it called "traditional negligence concepts" 10 8 on the
television network because of the "chilling effect" 1°9 they would have on
speech. The court wrote that "the deterrent effect of subjecting the
television networks to negligence liability because of their programming
choices would lead to self-censorship which would dampen the vigor and
limit the variety of public debate."' 10  Importantly, the California
appellate court noted that while the United States Supreme Court has
allowed the use of a negligence standard in defamation law cases
involving private figures, the use of a negligence standard "does not
105. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 367 (1974) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (describing negligence, in defamation law, as a "reasonable-care
standard"); Rutt v. Bethlehems' Globe Publ'g Co., 484 A.2d 72, 83 (Pa. 1984)
(holding that "a private figure defamation plaintiff' is required to "prove that the
defamatory matter was published with 'want of reasonable care and diligence to
ascertain the truth' or, in the vernacular, with negligence" (emphasis added)). See
generally JOHN D. ZELEZNY, COMMUNICATIONS LAW: LIBERTIES, RESTRAINTS, AND
MODERN MEDIA 138 (5th ed. 2007) (discussing negligence as a "reasonable care"
standard in defamation actions).
106. ROBERT TRAGER ET AL., THE LAW OF JOURNALISM & MASS
COMMUNICATION 115 (2007).
107. Olivia N. v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 126 Cal. App. 3d 488, 494-95 (1981).
108. Id. at 494.
109. Id.
I10. Id.
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extend more broadly to tort liability for speech in areas outside the law of
defamation." The California appellate court, like courts in other cases
involving very similar scenarios,"' thus chose to apply the incitement-to-
violence standard, fashioned by the United States Supreme Court in
Brandenburg v. Ohio,112 which focuses not on the reasonable
foreseeability of an act occurring, but rather on whether the actor actually
directed or intended for the act to occur.1 3 The Supreme Court has
interpreted the word "directed" '114 in the Brandenburg incitement test to
mean "intended to produce."15
The bottom line, then, is that judicial adoption of a negligence-
based, reasonable-foreseeability standard on the threshold jurisdictional
question, like the standard adopted in Wisniewski, is far from an
inevitable rule or a foregone conclusion. Negligence need not be
adopted here and, indeed, as illustrated above, it has been rejected by
111. See, e.g., Sanders v. Acclaim Entrn't, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1281
(D. Colo. 2002) (finding, in the context of a wrongful death action blaming video
game manufacturers for the murders committed by Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris at
Columbine High School, that defendants owed no duty of care to the plaintiffs under
negligence law and holding, instead, that "Brandenburg remains the applicable
standard even where the individual allegedly incited to commit unlawful acts is a
minor"); Wilson v. Midway Games, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 167, 182 (D. Conn. 2002)
(ruling, in the context of a lawsuit claiming that the design and marketing of the
video game Mortal Kombat caused the death of a 13-year-old boy who was stabbed
by a person supposedly addicted to that game, that Brandenburg applied and
precluded liability even assuming "that Mortal Kombat caused violence and physical
harm to be visited upon" the deceased); McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 202 Cal. App. 3d
989, 1000 (1988) (holding, in the context of a case in which a suicide was blamed on
listening to an Ozzy Osbourne record, that, due to First Amendment concerns,
liability could only be imposed on the record company under the test from
Brandenburg, and that, as applied to this case, the plaintiffs had to prove "that
Osbourne's music was directed and intended toward the goal of bringing about the
imminent suicide of listeners . .
112. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
113. The Supreme Court in Brandenburg held that the "constitutional
guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe
advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action." Id. at 447 (emphasis added).
114. Id.
115. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 109 (1973).
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courts in other contexts in which constitutional concerns for freedom of
expression were at stake.'6
This distinction-whether a result or outcome is merely
foreseeable or whether it is actually intended-would make a vast
difference on the jurisdictional question at issue in cases like Wisniewski.
In a nutshell, it obviously is much easier for a school to obtain
disciplinary jurisdiction when the question is whether it was reasonably
foreseeable that a student's off-campus-created website, web page or IM
icon would come to the attention of school authorities. This rule, for
instance, would not protect from disciplinary authority a student who not
only does not subjectively intend for his off-campus website to come to
the attention of school authorities, but who actually posts messages on
the home page that objectively indicate that he does not want it coming
to the school's attention, such as "Please Do Not Tell School Officials
About My Website" or "This Site is Intended for Student Use Only" or
"Leave This Website Now If You Are a Teacher or School Official."
In fact, some students have actually posted similar warnings or
disclaimers, yet still faced in-school wrath. For instance, a school in
Washington state punished a student for a website that "included
disclaimers warning a visitor that the site was not sponsored by the
school, and for entertainment purposes only.""' 7 The Commonwealth
Court of Pennsylvania upheld the school's punishment of the student for
the website despite the fact that the site had a disclaimer."
8
On the other hand, a jurisdictional standard that focuses solely
on the intent of the student-whether the student intended for the
message to come to school officials' attention-would clearly be more
protective of speech. It seems doubtful, for instance, that a college-
bound student who mocks a high school teacher or principal on a website
actually wants that individual-the target of the student's criticism,
satire, or other defamation--to find out. Why? Because the student
probably would fear precisely the type of in-school punishment-
suspension, expulsion, or transfer to an alternative school-that schools
116. Supra notes 106-114 and accompanying text.
117. Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist., 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1089 (W.D. Wash.
2000).
118. J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 757 A.2d 412, 425-26 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2000).
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are, in fact, meting out. Such a disciplinary blemish on a high school
record easily could jeopardize or threaten a potential offer of admission
from a college or university. Student-created web pages that mock
principals, teachers and students are much more likely intended for the
mirth and amusement of other students (however childish the humor may
be) than they are for grabbing the attention of the school authorities.
Returning to the jurisdictional standard actually adopted by the
Second Circuit in Wisniewski, it is important to understand just how easy
it is for schools to gain jurisdictional authority over off-campus-created
internet expression when all that is necessary is for it to be "reasonably
foreseeable" 1 9 that the speech will "come to the attention of school
authorities. ' ' 120 There are, in this author's opinion, at least three reasons
why it is reasonably foreseeable that nearly any and all controversial or
provocative speech that is created and posted off campus by a student
will come to the attention of school authorities:
1. Tattletale Students: It is reasonably foreseeable that at least
one student in a school will play the role of whistleblower or snitch and
reveal the misdeeds of others. Indeed, this is precisely what happened in
Wisniewski, as the icon at issue came to the attention of a do-gooder
student who did not actually receive it from Aaron Wisniewski but who
felt compelled, for whatever reason, to tell the teacher and "later supplied
him with a copy of the icon.
'121
2. Curious Teachers/Administrators: Given that school officials
are now well aware of the types of internet postings that students today
often create, it is reasonably foreseeable that some teachers and
principals will proactively search online, via Google, Yahoo or other
search engines, for postings about themselves or their school. Just as a
college professor today might take a gander at the website
122RateMyProfessors.com to see what students are saying about him or
119. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2007).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 36.
122. This website describes itself as:
the Internet's largest listing of collegiate professor ratings,
with more than 6.8 million student-generated ratings of
over 1 million professors. Each year, millions of college
students use the site to help plan their class schedules and
rate current and past professors on attributes such as
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her, so too might a curious middle-school or high-school teacher or
principal go online to search for the good, the bad and the ugly, as it
were, about themselves and their school. Police today actively search
out social-networking sites like Facebook for evidence of crimes
committed by college students, l1 3 so it is quite foreseeable that high
school administrators seeking to squelch trouble before it happens or to
nip it in the bud would do the same.
3. In-School Buzz/Discussion: If a student has created a
provocative website regarding classmates or teachers, there is certain to
be some level of hallway gossip and buzz about it that, quite foreseeably,
might be overheard by school officials. Indeed, in his September 2008
opinion in J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District,124 U.S. District Judge
James Munley wrote that "[a]lthough the students created the profile at
J.S.'s home, news of it soon spread to the school. The next day students
were already discussing the website at school.' 25 The judge added that
"[d]iscussion of the website continued through the day, and there was a
general 'buzz' in the school with quite a few people knowing about it."' 26
It is possible, of course, for all three of the above influences to
be at work and to coalesce in any given situation, making it just that
much more foreseeable that an off-campus posting will come to the
attention of school authorities. Hallway gossip about a website might
inspire a tattletale student to come forward to school officials, for
instance, or such gossip might trigger an inquisitive principal to either go
helpfulness and clarity. Online since 1999,
RateMyProfessors.com currently offers ratings on college
and university professors from over 6,000 schools across
the United States, Canada, England, Scotland and Wales
with thousands of new ratings added each day.
RateMyProfessors.com, About Us, http://www.ratemyprofessors.com/About.jsp (last
visited Apr. 3, 2009).
123. See Erica Perez, Crime and Computers; Getting Booked by Facebook,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Oct. 3, 2007, at Al ("Facebook.com and MySpace.com
are the newest crime-busting tools in a police officer's repertoire, particularly for
campus police, who are using the sites to investigate student crimes and violations
and gather information about where students live and whom they know. In some
cases, the information they find is making its way into court.").
124. No. 3:07cv585, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72685 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2008).
125. Id. at *3.
126. Id. at *4.
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online to find out what the discussion is about or to start asking students
about it until, at last, the principal comes across the one obliging
whistleblower student he or she is seeking.
Two more points about the Second Circuit's application of its
test in Wisniewski are important to mention. First, as noted earlier,127 in
concluding that it was "at least foreseeable to a reasonable person, if not
inevitable" 1 8 that the student's IM icon would come to the attention of
school authorities, the Second Circuit made reference to what it called
"the extensive distribution of [the icon], which encompassed 15••.,,129 exesie3s0lunn i
recipients. If fifteen students constitutes "extensive distribution' 30 n
a digital age, then anything posted on the intemet-the "world" wide
web-blows that away. Second, to the extent that the Second Circuit
also focused, in its foreseeability determination, on the fact that there
was "a three-week circulation period" of the icon, it must be pointed out
that nearly anything posted on the internet can be downloaded, cached,
or simply printed out, no matter how long the actual web page in
question stays up. For instance, it is clearly foreseeable that a student-
in particular, one who is troubled by something vicious posted online by
another student-might print out the objectionable content and take it to
school officials the next day, even if the webpage itself is taken down by
its creator (perhaps because he or she had second thoughts about the
content he or she was posting).
The bottom line is that it is reasonably foreseeable that almost
any provocative form of student speech posted online that criticizes or
castigates students, teachers, or administrators will come to the attention
of school authorities. It is a jurisdictional standard that appears to be
very easy for school officials to prove.
Ten months after its ruling in Wisniewski, the Second Circuit
issued a second opinion addressing the off-campus student speech issue
in a case called Doninger v. Niehoff 3 1 That opinion, as it relates to the
knotty jurisdictional issue, is described below in Section B.
127. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
128. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 40.
129. Id. at 39.
130. Id.
131. 527 F.3d41 (2d Cir. 2008).
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B. Doninger v. Niehoff
This case centered on a publicly accessible blog entry, posted on
a website called livejournal.com, that was made by a high school student
named Avery Doninger "within the confines of her home." '32 The entry,
which the appellate court described as "a vulgar and misleading message
about the supposed cancellation of an upcoming school event,"' 33
resulted in Doninger being prohibited from running for the position of
senior class secretary at Lewis Mills High School (LMHS) 34  The
posting referred to school administrators as the "douchebags in central
office"'35 and encouraged fellow students either to write or call the
superintendent in order "to piss her off more."
' 36
Citing its decision in Wisniewski, the Second Circuit wrote that
"a student may be disciplined for expressive conduct, even conduct
occurring off school grounds, when this conduct 'would foreseeably
create a risk of substantial disruption within the school environment,' at
least when it was similarly foreseeable that the off-campus expression
might also reach campus."' 37 It is the latter, italicized portion of this
statement that addresses the jurisdictional question; the former part,
regarding substantial disruption, taps into the substantive rule from
Tinker that applies once jurisdiction exists."'
This phrasing of the jurisdictional rule in Doninger (whether the
speech would "reach campus") 139 is slightly different from that in
Wisniewski (whether the speech "would come to the attention of school
authorities"). 14 It is unclear whether "reach" means physically to come
on to campus (like an underground student newspaper distributed on
campus) or merely to reach the attention of administrators. Regardless of
132. Id. at 49.
133. Id. at 43.
134. Doninger was the Junior Class Secretary at the time of the incident. Id. at
44.
135. Id. at 45.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 48 (quoting Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir.
2007)) (emphasis added).
138. See supra note 6 (describing the Supreme Court's ruling in Tinker).
139. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 48.
140. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 38.
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the semantics, however, the overriding focus is squarely on the
reasonable foreseeability of possible outcomes occurring.
In applying its variation of the jurisdictional rule, the appellate
court in Doninger wrote:
the record amply supports the district court's
conclusion that it was reasonably foreseeable that
Avery's posting would reach school property.
Indeed, the district court found that her posting,
although created off-campus, "was purposely
designed by Avery to come onto the campus." The
blog posting directly pertained to events at LMHS,
and Avery's intent in writing it was specifically "to
encourage her fellow students to read and respond."
As the district court found, "Avery knew other
LMHS community members were likely to read [her
posting]." Several students did in fact post
comments in response to Avery and, as in
Wisniewski, the posting managed to reach school
administrators. The district court thus correctly
determined that in these circumstances, "it was
reasonably foreseeable that other LMHS students
would view the blog and that school administrators
would become aware of it.''.
In unpacking this analysis and application of the reasonable
foreseeability rule to the facts of the case, several factors seem to
emerge. Most strikingly, the determination takes into account the intent
of the writer, as the court focuses on how Avery Doninger "purposely
designed"'142 the posting to come onto campus. In addition, the court
discusses "Avery's intent."' 143 This intent-infused focus on foreseeability
seems to contrast with the statement made by the Second Circuit in
Wisniewski that discipline was permissible "whether or not Aaron
intended his IM icon to be ... communicated to school authorities ...
141. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 50 (citations omitted).
142. Id.
143. Id.
239
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,,144 The reconciliation, however, between the two cases seems to be
this:
* intent of the student-author may be a relevant
factor on the foreseeability determination of whether
the speech will reach campus or come to the
attention of school officials;
* intent of the student-author for the speech not to
come to the attention of school authorities, however,
will not preclude a judicial finding that school
officials have proper disciplinary jurisdiction over
the speech.
It also is clear that the content of the blog entry made it
reasonably foreseeable the posting would come to the attention of school
authorities. In particular, Avery Doninger specifically urged her fellow
students to contact the superintendent, thus making it likely that, at some
point, the superintendent would inquire about why she was being
bombarded with emails from students on the particular issue Avery
Doninger addressed.
In summary, the Second Circuit has adopted, in both Wisniewski
and Doninger, a jurisdictional test for school discipline over off-campus-
created speech that focuses on the reasonable foreseeability of that
speech either coming to the attention of school officials or reaching
campus. Section A addressed problems with the expansive nature of
such an approach in giving schools broad authority over off-campus-
created student expression.
The next two sections focus on two federal district court
opinions, both handed down after Morse v. Frederick and both arising
from courts within the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
C. Layshock v. Hermitage School District'45
In this July 2007 opinion by a federal court in the Western
District of Pennsylvania, U.S. District Judge Terrence F. McVerry
considered a case centering on the constitutionality of the in-school
144. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 40.
145. 496 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Pa. 2007).
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punishment meted out to student Justin Layshock for creating a parody
profile of his high school principal that he posted on MySpace.
Layshock created the profile of Principal Eric Trosch "using his
grandmother's computer, at her home, during non-school hours.' 46 One
of four fake profiles created by students about Trosch, it was "viewed in-
school by other students.' 47 The various profiles resulted in the school's
technology coordinator devoting significant time to blocking access to
them, 148 and Trosch convened a teachers meeting about them (a meeting
he left after he "became very emotional and could not continue"). 149 It
thus was, as Judge McVerry aptly put it, a case of "purely out-of-school
conduct which subsequently carried over into the school setting.,
150
In addressing the jurisdictional question-a task he called the
"threshold, and most difficult, inquiry"' 5 Judge McVerry began with
language highly favorable to student expression rights:
The mere fact that the internet may be accessed at
school does not authorize school officials to become
censors of the world-wide web. Public schools are
vital institutions, but their reach is not unlimited.
Schools have an undoubted right to control conduct
within the scope of their activities, but they must
share the supervision of children with other, equally
vital, institutions such as families, churches,
community organizations and the judicial system. 52
This language suggests not only that school officials cannot
claim jurisdiction simply because a website can be downloaded in
school, but it also recognizes that schools cannot usurp all parental
control when minors are not on school grounds. But Judge McVerry
carefully weighed the interests and did not conclude that school officials
146. Id. at 591.
147. Id. at 592.
148. See id. at 593 (explaining that the technology coordinator claimed he
spent twenty-five percent of his time during a one-week period on issues related to
the profiles, including the one created by Justin Layshock).
149. Id. at 592.
150. Id. at 595.
151. Id. at 597.
152. Id. (emphasis added).
are rendered completely powerless or impotent once students step foot
outside the schoolhouse gate and off campus:
It is clear that the test for school authority is not
geographical. The reach of school administrators is
not strictly limited to the school's physical property.
For example, schools have an undoubted ability to
govern student conduct at school-sponsored field
trips, sporting events, academic competitions and
during transit to and from such activities.
53
In an analysis that far exceeded, in terms of both nuance and
depth, that of the Second Circuit in either Wisniewski or Doninger, Judge
McVerry noted that an alternative approach to a purely geographical
determination of jurisdictional authority is a temporal approach that
defines the times (rather than the locations) when schools can exert
authority, in loco parentis, over their students.154 He observed that the
Pennsylvania Public School Code uses such a time-based approach, with
school officials acting in the role of parents "during ... time ... they are
in attendance, including the time required in going to and from their
homes."155
In addition to geographical and temporal approaches to
jurisdictional authority, Judge McVerry suggested that the Supreme
Court in Tinker employed what he called "an operational test"'56 under
which "student First Amendment rights do not embrace merely the
classroom hours, but also extend to the cafeteria, the playing fields and
on-campus conduct during authorized hours.' ' 157 The Tinker operational
153. Id. at 598.
154. See id. at 598-99.
155. Id. at 599. The relevant Pennsylvania statute provides:
Every teacher, vice principal and principal in the public
schools shall have the right to exercise the same authority as
to conduct and behavior over the pupils attending his school,
during the time they are in attendance, including the time
required in going to and from their homes, as the parents,
guardians or persons in parental relation to such pupils may
exercise over them.
24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 13-1317 (2006).
156. Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 599.
157. Id.
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test, according to Judge McVerry, also includes consideration of
substantial disruptions to, and interferences with, the school's operations.
On this point, Judge McVerry appears to be blending the substantive rule
from Tinker for determining when a school can censor student speech 58
with the threshold question of when schools can assert jurisdiction over it
in the first place.
He also noted that the High Court in Morse used what he
considered to be "contextual factors" in determining that the speech of
student Joseph Frederick was school related, such as the facts that the
speech "occurred during normal school hours, at a sanctioned school
event, in the presence of teachers and administrators charged with
supervising students, the school band and cheerleaders performed, and
the message was directed at most of the student body."'59
Judge McVerry, in a nutshell, considered multiple approaches to
the jurisdictional question, including geographical, temporal, operational
and contextual variables. In adopting a holistic rule that allows for
consideration of all these factors, the judge concluded that "in cases
involving off-campus speech, such as this one, the school must
demonstrate an appropriate nexus. As the case law demonstrates, on this
threshold 'jurisdictional' question the Court will not defer to the
conclusions of school administrators."' 
60
This statement is striking for two reasons. First, Judge McVerry
refuses to grant judicial deference to school administrators on a matter
affecting the First Amendment speech rights of students. This is rather
remarkable because, since the tragedy at Columbine High School in
April 1999,16 courts have granted vast deference to school officials
when it comes to squelching any speech that can be perceived as a threat
158. The court in Tinker held that schools may censor such student displays of
political expression only when there is actual evidence the speech in question
"materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the
rights of others. .. ." Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
513 (1969).
159. Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 599.
160. Id. (emphasis added).
161. See generally Paul Duggan et al., Killers Fused Violent Fantasy, Reality,
WASH. POST, Apr. 22, 1999, at Al (reporting on the savage killing of twelve students
and a teacher by Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold at Columbine High School in
Jefferson County, Colorado).
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of violence.162 Judge McVerry easily could have given similar deference
to administrators on the jurisdictional question, accepting their
arguments about the dangers of new technologies, the need to control
cyberbullying and the desire to stop in-school disruptions allegedly
caused by off-campus expression. For a point of comparison, the Second
Circuit in Wisniewski and Doninger never expressed the sentiment that it
would not defer to the conclusions of school administrators on the
jurisdictional issue.
Second, Judge McVerry's approach does not, unlike the Second
Circuit in both Wisniewski and Doninger, adopt a test that focuses on the
reasonable foreseeability of off-campus-created speech coming to the
attention of, or reaching, school officials. As argued earlier, that test is
very expansive and favorable toward giving school officials jurisdiction.
The obvious question, however, with McVerry's "appropriate
nexus' 6 3 test is: An appropriate nexus between what and what? The first
"what" component of the equation is easy-the initial "what" is the
student's off-campus-created speech. The second "what" appears to be
an intrusion into the realm of the school's alleged authority over the
speech "based on [the speech's] timing, function, context or interference
with its operations . .. " 164
The other problem, of course, is one of vagueness. In particular,
what constitutes an "appropriate" nexus? How close of a connection
must there be between the student's speech and either the location where
it was created (geographical), the time when it was created (temporal),
the scope of school resources used in its creation or whether it was
downloaded at school (contextual), or whether it interfered with the
162. One federal court recently observed that, against the backdrop of school
shootings like those at Columbine:
courts across the country have considered First Amendment
challenges to discipline imposed on students for speech that
school officials viewed as threatening. The overwhelming
response has been deference on the part of courts to the
judgment of educators as to whether a perceived threat
should be taken seriously and met with discipline in order to
ensure the safety of the school community.
Cuff v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 559 F. Supp. 2d 415, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
163. Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 599.
164. Id. at 599.
244 [Vol. 7
2009] SCHOOL BASHING IN CYBERSPACE
operations of the school (operational)? Judge McVerry does little to
clear up the problem of the ambiguity created by the phrase "appropriate
nexus" when he later uses the term "sufficient nexus."' 65  Parsed
differently, both "appropriate" and "sufficient" are terms rife with
ambiguity. While, on the facts in Layshock, Judge McVerry concluded
that the school had not met its jurisdictional burden, and he ruled in favor
of Justin Layshock, 166 it is not clear how the appropriate nexus test would
play out in other factual scenarios. What does seem clear is that the test
accounts for the potential weighing and balancing of many different
variables, not simply and solely an examination of the foreseeability of
the speech reaching the attention of school officials.
D. J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District
167
As in Layshock, this opinion came from a federal district court in
Pennsylvania and, likewise, centered on a fake MySpace profile of a
168public school principal that was created by a student while off campus.
But unlike Judge McVerry in Layshock, U.S. District Judge James
Munley took a rather cursory and radically different approach to the
threshold jurisdiction question.
In particular, Judge Munley cited as authority on this question a
federal district court decision dating back to 1976 and holding that:
when a high school student refers to a high school
teacher in a public place on a Sunday by a lewd and
obscene name in such a loud voice that the teacher
and others hear the insult it may be deemed a matter
for discipline in the discretion of the school
authorities. To countenance such student conduct
even in a public place without imposing sanctions
165. Id. at 600.
166. Id. at 601 (concluding that "the School District has failed to demonstrate
a sufficient causal nexus between Justin's conduct and any substantial disruption of
school operations").
167. Memorandum & Order, J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., No. 3:07cv585
(M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2008), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-
courts/pennsylvania/pamdce/3:2007cv00585/67046/55/0.pdf (last visited Apr. 3,
2009).
168. Id. at 1-2.
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could lead to devastating consequences in the
school.
169
That case, Fenton v. Stear, involved a student who called a
teacher a "prick"1 70 while sitting in a car at a shopping center parking
lot.17' The outcome in Fenton stands in stark contrast to the opinion
issued a decade later in Klein v. Smith and described earlier in this
172 173
article. Judge Munley only mentioned Klein in a footnote; in
contrast, he addressed and cited approvingly Fenton in the actual text of
his opinion. 174 To his credit, however, Judge Munley acknowledged that
"neither Klein nor Fenton are directly on-point with our case, and neither
applies a rule of law set down from a higher court."
'' 75
Applying Fenton to the situation in J.S., Judge Munley found
"much more of a connection between the off-campus action and on-
campus effect" in J.S. In concluding that the school had jurisdictional
authority over student Jill Snyder's fake MySpace profile of her
principal, the judge wrote:
The website addresses the principal of the school. Its
intended audience is students at the school. A paper
copy of the website was brought into school, and the
website was discussed in school. The picture on the
profile was appropriated from the school district's
website. Plaintiff [student Jill Snyder] crafted the
profile out of anger at the principal for punishment
the plaintiff had received at school for violating the
dress code.
176
A close parsing of the first three sentences of this quotation
suggests that if a student's off-campus-created speech targets a school
official and its intended audience is comprised of fellow students, then
schools likely have authority over it if the speech generates in-school
169. Fenton v. Stear, 423 F. Supp. 767, 772 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
170. Id. at 769.
171. Id.
172. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
173. J.S., supra note 167 at 13 n.6.
174. Id. at 13.
175. Id. at 13-14 n.6.
176. Id. at 14.
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discussion. Factors thus include the target of the speech (in this case the
principal), the audience for the speech (students), and the discussion
created by the speech.
The problem with this trio of factors is that they give schools
authority over almost all the off-campus-created speech that now is
generating controversies. In particular, the target of the speech, almost
invariably, is someone in school (a teacher, a principal, a student), the
intended audience usually is fellow students (as suggested earlier, most
students certainly don't intend for teachers or administrators to read the
off-campus, web-posted musings about them)177 and some level of in-
school discussion is bound to take place. Importantly, Judge Munley did
not require there to be any particular quantity or amount of discussion
before jurisdiction is permissible; he merely considered the fact that "the
website was discussed in school. ' 78 The J.S. opinion was on appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for Third Circuit in 2009, with oral argument
slated for early June 2009.
With the discussion and analysis of the quartet of opinions from
Wisniewski, Doninger, Layshock, and J.S. in mind, the next part of this
article examines the briefs filed in 2008 by the parties in Layshock with
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. That case is now
pending with the Third Circuit, with oral argument having taken place on
December 10, 2008. 179 A decision had not yet been rendered when final
editing of this article took place in early April of 2009.
III. LA YSHOCK ON APPEAL: COMPETING ARGUMENTS REGARDING
SCHOOL JURISDICTION
In their appellate brief filed in April 2008 with the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, the attorneys for Justin Layshock
completely reject the notion that school officials should ever have any
authority over off-campus-created speech such as Layshock's fake
177. Supra note 117 and text immediately following.
178. J.S., supra note 167, at 14.
179. See Jennifer Lin, Appeals Judges Hear Internet Freedom of Speech Case,
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Dec. 11, 2008, at B5 (describing oral argument in
Layshock)
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MySpace profile."8 In contending that any disciplinary authority over
such speech belongs to parents and not government authorities,
Layshock's attorneys write:
[E]xpanding school officials' authority to discipline
student speech to those times when students are not
under school supervision would usurp the rights of
their parents to direct their children's upbringing and
would impose the more restrictive in-school
standards on students' out-of-school speech. The
School District. . . is insisting that it be given the
unprecedented authority to punish students for
speech, such as profanity, that otherwise would be
constitutionally protected. That argument
contravenes the well-established precedent holding
that, outside the school environment, minors have
substantial free-speech rights that sharply limit all
government officials, including school
administrators, from engaging in the type of
censorship the School District advocates.181
The semantics here are important. When minors are away from
campus and engaging in speech activities that are not supervised by the
school, they are no longer students but are, instead, simply minors-
indeed, citizens-with substantial rights. As Layshock's appellate brief
contends, "[w]hen Justin posted the Trosch profile off of school grounds
and during non-school hours, the School District had no authority over
him and, thus, his expression was entitled to the same constitutional
protection enjoyed by any other citizen."'' 82
Schools, however, are not entirely remediless here, according to
Layshock's attorneys, who write that administrators "can inform
students' parents if they have concerns about the students' off-campus
speech; and they can even contact police if they believe the expression
180. Second-Step Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellants, Layshock v.
Hermitage Sch. Dist., Nos. 07-4465 & 07-4555, 42-54 (3d Cir. May 22, 2008),
available at http://www.aclupa.org/downloads/Layshock2dStepBrief.pdf [hereinafter
Second-Step Brief].
181. Id. at 18-19.
182. Id. at 39 (emphasis added).
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constitutes harassment or a terroristic threat. But school officials'
authority to use their state-conferred authority to punish ends at the
schoolhouse gate.,
183
What standard, then, would apply to censor the speech of a
minor when he or she is engaging in off-campus expression? For
Layshock's attorneys, the answer is simple-the rigorous strict
scrutiny 84 standard that applies to all content-based restrictions 185 on
speech.1
86
In stark contrast to this position, the attorneys for the Hermitage
School District contend that they should have jurisdiction over Justin
Layshock's off-campus expression because a "sufficient nexus exists"
' 87
between the profile and the School District. Under its proposed
sufficient nexus test for jurisdiction, the school district specifically
advises the appellate court to consider that Layshock's speech was
"aimed at" 188 a school official and that it was "reasonably foreseeable
183. Id. at 41.
184. Under the strict scrutiny standard of review, the burden is on the
government to prove the censorship or regulation at issue furthers "a compelling
interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest." FEC v. Wisc. Right to Life,
Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2664 (2007). In deciding if a regulation is narrowly tailored
under the strict scrutiny test, the Supreme Court has held that "[i]f a less restrictive
alternative would serve the Government's purpose, the legislature must use that
alternative." United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000). See
also Sable Commc'ns Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (writing that the
government may "regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order
to promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further
the articulated interest").
185. See generally Wilson R. Huhn, Assessing the Constitutionality of Laws
That Are Both Content-Based and Content-Neutral: The Emerging Constitutional
Calculus, 79 IND. L.J. 801 (2004) (providing an overview of the differences between
content-based law and content-neutral laws, and examining the difficulties in
applying these two classifications).
186. Second-Step Brief, supra note 180, at 19.
187. Brief of Appellant / Cross-Appellee at 9, Layshock v. Hermitage Sch.
Dist., Nos. 07-4465 & 07-4555, at 9 (3d Cir. Mar. 27, 2008), available at
http://www.citmedialaw.org/sites/citmedialaw.org/files/2008-03-27-Hermitage
%20School%20District%20Appellate%2OBrief.pdf [hereinafter Brief of Appellant].
The brief uses the term "sufficient nexus" several times, apparently to reinforce the
point that this is the jurisdictional rule the School District is proposing. See id. at 9,
13 (using term "sufficient nexus").
188. Id. at 9.
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that the profile would come to the attention of the School District and the
Principal."'
189
The operationalization of a sufficient nexus test that is based on
a reasonable foreseeability standard raises the precise problems already
addressed above in the analysis of the Second Circuit's 2007 opinion in
Wisniewski v. Board of Education.'90 As extensively argued in Part II,
Section A, it is reasonably foreseeable that nearly any and all
controversial or provocative speech that is created and posted off campus
by a student will come to the attention of school authorities. Thus, it is
quite logical that the Hermitage School District would argue for adoption
of such a standard in Layshock, as it was used in favor of school officials
in both Wisniewski and Doninger. The "aimed at" portion of the School
District's proposed sufficient nexus test adds little teeth to it, as it simply
suggests that any off-campus speech that targets or merely is about
someone on campus falls within the jurisdictional reach of the school. In
addition to these problems with the School District's proposed rule, there
are profound vagueness difficulties in implementing any test that
requires a "sufficient" or "appropriate" nexus of connection; Part II,
Section C explored these problems in the context of Judge McVerry's
ruling in Layshock.
Finally, and not surprisingly, the appellate brief for the
Hermitage School District does not address or even raise the issue of
whether students should be treated as citizens when they are off campus.
Instead, it focuses solely on Justin Layshock as a student, not as either a
minor or a citizen.
IV. CONCLUSION
As this article has illustrated, there are serious disputes and
disagreements today about when, if ever, public school officials have
jurisdictional authority to punish students who create, while off campus
and working from their own computers, internet-based messages that
disparage, defame or otherwise criticize students, teachers and
administrators. The only items here, in fact, that seem readily clear at
189. Id.
190. See supra Part II, Section A (analyzing Wisniewski).
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this stage are that: 1) the U.S. Supreme Court needs, very soon, to hear a
case that directly deals with this issue, thus adding, in the process, a
critical fifth decision to its current quartet of rulings affecting student
free-expression rights; and 2) creating a clear, coherent and concise
jurisdictional test that not only is workable but also strikes a proper
balance between the First Amendment speech rights of off-campus
minors and the need of schools to function smoothly and effectively as
educational institutions will be a prodigious and staggering task. Adding
to this complex mix of competing interests are the rights of parents - not
simply schools - to control their children, however they see fit.
This article has identified multiple flaws and problems with all
of the approaches considered by the courts in Wisniewski, Doninger,
Layshock and J.S. In particular, an approach like that adopted by the
Second Circuit that relies solely on whether it is reasonably foreseeable
that the speech in question will come to the attention of school
authorities gives schools sweeping off-campus jurisdictional power. As
Judge McVerry suggested in Layshock, it is perhaps better to consider
multiple factors, be they geographic, temporal, contextual, and/or
operational, rather than employing a single-factor approach.19  Such a
multiple-variable test allows for a more nuanced, context-specific
approach, recognizing that no two student-speech cases will be exactly
the same.
In addition, the fact that aggrieved students and school personnel
already have civil law remedies, such as libel suits, for off-campus
speech that causes them harm militates against the adoption of a standard
that easily provides schools with jurisdictional authority. Minors will
learn important, real-world lessons about the limitations of free speech
and the First Amendment (as well as lessons about the steep financial
costs of defending a lawsuit) when they are sued for defamation for
bloggings and MySpace postings, regardless of whether they are
suspended or expelled from school. What's more, even if school
officials are not given jurisdictional authority to punish students, those
officials still possess the opportunity to inculcate important values. As
the attorneys for Justin Layshock argue in their brief filed with the Third
Circuit, "school officials may discuss with the student how the out-of-
191. Supra notes 152-159 and accompanying text.
school expression offended or affected others. . 192 Judge McVerry's
profound reluctance to extend judicial deference to school officials on
the threshold jurisdictional issue thus makes sense, given both the extant
civil law and pedagogical remedies.
93
One somewhat subtle factor lurking in the background of all of
this, in this author's opinion, is a fear of the power of relatively new
technologies with which students are much more comfortable and
familiar than many of their teachers and principals. MySpace profiles,
IM icons and online blogs are undoubtedly new phenomena for many
school administrators to have to face and confront. It's much easier,
after all, for a janitor to scrub away graffiti from a bathroom wall than it
is for a principal to cleanse the World Wide Web of unsavory expression.
What's more, internet-posted messages certainly reach a far larger
audience than any notebook marginalia or bathroom-stall scribblings.
But the fear of the powerful, unknown or unfamiliar must not be used as
a rationale to affect and reduce the First Amendment rights of minors
when they embrace these technologies away from campus. As the
attorneys for Justin Layshock assert, "the First Amendment does not
permit the government to regulate a particular medium of speech solely
because that medium is more effective than others."' ' 94
The bottom line is that it is time for the Supreme Court to move
past hearing student-speech cases like Morse that feature relatively
idiosyncratic fact patterns like Morse and to take up, instead, the
challenge of an exceedingly difficult but very common issue now
plaguing both minors and schools across the country.
192. Second-Step Brief, supra note 180, at 25.
193. See supra notes 159-160 and accompanying text.
194. Second-Step Brief, supra note 180, at 32 (emphasis in original).
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